Introduction
Are women more altruistic than men? Previous research suggests so. For example, in the US in 1991, during a recession, women increased their philanthropic giving by 2.4 percent, while men decreased theirs by over 20 percent (Mixer, 1993) . It has been shown that women typically give more than men to charity (Breeze and Thornton, 2006; Piper and Schnepf, 2008; Mesch et al., 2011) . Social role theorists have also argued that women are expected to be communal and unselfish, while men are expected to be agentic and independent (Eagly, 1987; Williams and Best, 1990; Eagly, 2009) , and that these differential expectations affect work performance. For example, when women are perceived to be not sufficiently altruistic, they are less likely to be hired, promoted, paid fairly, and given responsibilities in their jobs (Heilman and Chen, 2005; Heilman and Okimoto, 2007) .
To explore gender differences in altruistic behaviour, experimental economists typically turn to the aseptic setting of controlled laboratory experiments using the Dictator Game (DG).
In the DG one player acts in the role of dictator and the other one in the role of receiver. Dictators are given a certain amount of money and are asked how much, if any, they want to give to the receiver. Receivers have no choice and only get what the dictators decide to give. Since dictators have no incentives to give money, a payoff-maximising dictator would donate nothing. Dictators' donations are thus taken as a measure of individual's general altruistic tendencies (Brañas-Garza, 2006 , 2007 Charness and Gneezy, 2008; Engel, 2011; Franzen and Pointner, 2013; Peysakhovich et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2016) .
Several studies have found that, on average, women give more than men in DG experiments (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Boschini et al., 2014; Capraro and Marcelletti, 2014; Capraro, 2015; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, 2002; Dreber et al., 2013 Dreber et al., , 2014 Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006; Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Houser and Schunk, 2009; Kettner and Ceccato, 2014; Rand et al., 2016) . See Bolton and Katok (1995) for a null result, although using an extrememly small sample. However, there are also critical exceptions. In his meta-analysis of 616 DG experiments, Engel (2011) found that women are only marginally significantly more altruistic than men. Interestingly, Cappelen et al. (2015) and Carpenter et al. (2008) compared student to representative samples and found gender differences in the student samples but not in the representative samples, which led them to conclude that gender differences in DG altruism, if existing, may be domain-specific.
Here we contribute to the aforementioned literature by exploring gender differences in altruistic behaviour among Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers living in the US. AMT is an interesting platform to study gender differences in altruistic behaviour because AMT workers, although less representative than national probability samples (e.g., Asians are overrepresented and Blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented), are more representative than student samples (Berinsky et al., 2012; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014; Shapiro et al., 2013) . Moreover, numerous experiments have shown that data gathered on AMT are of no less quality than data gathered on the standard physical lab (Arechar et al., 2018; Horton et al., 2011; Mason and Suri, 2012; Paolacci et al., 2010; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014) .
In Study 1, we analyse more than 3,500 previously collected DG donations, and we test whether women are more altruistic than men. In Study 2, we collect new experimental data with the intention to explore whether women are expected to be more altruistic than men or not.
Understanding gender differences in expectations of altruistic behaviour is relevant because people often make decisions based on their beliefs about others' behaviour. Thus, a mismatch between expectations and behaviour may create suboptimal outcomes. For example, in a family context, the production of human capital for children requires both mothers' and fathers' inputs (e.g., time for playing, reading to the child). If fathers expect mothers to be more willing to spend time on producing health and skills for the child, fathers may invest less time in the production of human capital than mothers. However, when fathers' expectations do not match with the actual behaviour of mothers, parental investment may result in suboptimal outcomes for their children and, consequently, for the family as a whole.
Although social psychologists have repeatedly found that women are expected to be more altruistic than men and are punished more than men when failing to act altruistically in a variety of contexts (Eagly, 1987 (Eagly, , 2009 Heilman and Chen, 2005; Heilman and Okimoto, 2007; Piliavin and Charng, 1990; Williams and Best, 1990) , this question has been largely neglected by experimental economists. We are aware of a handful of studies eliciting participants' beliefs about the level of altruism (Aguiar et al., 2009; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Delavande and Zafar, 2015; Capraro and Kuilder, 2016) , but only one of them looked at gender differences: Aguiar et al. (2009) , using a student sample, found that women are expected to be more altruistic than men, but only by other women. 1 2 Study 1
Protocol
We analyse all DG donations that we collected on AMT in several experiments conducted between 2013 and 2017 (d' Adda et al., 2017; Biziou-van Pol et al., 2015; Capraro and Kuilder, 2016; Capraro and Sippel, 2017; Rand et al., 2016) . In case of multiple observations from the same participant (as determined by checking for multiple IP addresses and TurkIDs), we keep only the first observation. All dictators passed two comprehension questions about the choice that would maximise their payoff and the choice that would maximise the recipient's payoff. We also include N = 457 observations reported in Study 2 of the current work. Excluding these observations does not change our main findings.
Subject pool
A total of 3,583 participants (58.2% males, mean age = 32.55), living in the US at the time of the experiments, recruited on AMT.
Results
In order to make data from different projects comparable, we first build a (quasi)continuous variable representing the proportion of the endowment that dictators give to recipients (0 = nothing, 1 = all). In the experiments reported in this mega-analysis, endowments were rather small, either $0.10 or $0.20 (on top of the participation fee, that ranged from $0.01 to $0.50, depending on the study). However, this is not problematic: the average proportion of the endowment donated in our mega-analysis is 30.8%, which is in line with the proportion reported in the meta-analysis conducted by Engel (2011) , that is 28.3%. This provides another piece of evidence that data gathered using small stakes on Amazon Mechanical Turk are of comparable quality than those collected in standard ways (see also Amir et al., 2012) .
Coming to our main research question, a linear regression of donations on gender (0 = male, 1 = female) shows that women give 5.7% more than men, and that this difference is statistically significant (coeff =0.057, t=5.75, p-value=0.000). The analysis of distribution of donations confirms and strengthens these result. See Figure 1a and Figure 1b . In line with the meta-analysis by Engel (2011) , we find a virtually bi-modal distribution of donations, with one main mode at giving nothing, and the other one at giving half. However, if we analyse men and women in detail, we find that the main mode for men is at giving nothing (45.7% give nothing, while only 36.1% give half); whereas the main mode for women is at giving half (49.4% give half, while only 31.2% give nothing). Furthermore, the median donation for men is at giving 20%, while the median donation for women is at giving 50% (Fisher's exact test: p-value=0.000). Both distributions are bimodal, concentrated in giving nothing and giving half. The mode for the male's distribution is to give nothing, while for the female's is to give half. In sum, women tend to give more than men.
3 Study 2
Protocol
Subjects were randomly divided between dictators and receivers. Dictators were given $0.20 and were asked to decide how much, if any, to give to the receiver. Receivers were asked to predict the donation that another dictator would make to another receiver in one of four betweensubjects treatments. Receivers would receive $0.20 reward for correct guesses (Capraro and Kuilder, 2016) . This procedure incentivises receivers to guess the modal donation. Moreover, since they do not guess their own donation there is no opportunity to hedge (Brañas-Garza et al., 2017) . The treatments were as follows. In the O n treatments, receivers were shown the same instructions given to dictators. Then they were asked to guess the dictator's decision; the O mow was identical to O n with the only difference that receivers were informed that the dictator was either a man or a woman; the O m was identical to O n with the only difference that recipients were informed that the dictator was a man; the O w was identical to O m with the only difference that receivers were informed that the dictator was a woman. We opted for conducting two baselines, O n and O mow , so that, by comparing O m and O w with O mow , separately, we can investigate the effect of making one particular gender salient versus making both genders salient.
At the end of the experiment, participants were matched. Bonuses were computed and paid on top of the participation fee of $0.50. No deception was used. See Appendix for more details about the procedure and experimental instructions.
Subject pool
A total of 987 subjects (55.9% males, mean age = 34.6), residents in the US at the time of the experiment, recruited on AMT. We refer to the Appendix for details about how these subjects were distributed across conditions.
Results
In line with Engel's meta-analysis (Engel, 2011) , the distribution of dictators' donations was virtually bimodal, with one mode at donating nothing (43.5%) and the other one at donating half (43.1%). The average donation was 27.3%. Also this was very close to that reported by Engel (28.3%) . Although, in our experiment, the endowment given to dictators was $0.20, in what follows, data are normalised such that the donations correspond to 0-1.
As a preliminary step, we show that the gender effect on dictators' donations found in Study 1 is replicated in the current sample. Figure 2a and Figure 2b compare the distribution of donations by men with the distribution of donations by women, and provides visual evidence that women are more altruistic than men: giving nothing is the modal choice for males (49.6% gave 0) while sharing equally is the modal choice for women (48.3% gave half). This gender difference is reflected also on the mean donations (24.8% vs 30.3%, linear regression, coeff = 0.055, t = 2.20, p-value=0.028), and in the median donations (10% vs 50%, Fisher's exact: p-value=0.031). Thus, also in the current sample, women are more altruistic than men, and the effect size is essentially the same as in Study 1. Figure 1 , both distributions are bimodal. Women tend to give more than men.
Next, we analyse gender differences in expectations of altruistic behaviour. First of all, we observe that treatments E n and E mow report similar averages (27.9% and 31.7%, linear regression, p-value=0.243) . Similarly, we do not find significant differences between E m ∪ E w and E mow (p-value= 0.887). Thus, gender framed instructions do not change subjects' expectations. Figures 3a, 3b show the histograms for E m and E w , respectively. While the main mode for expected behaviour of men is 0 (giving nothing) the main mode for expected behaviour of women is 5 (giving half). Average values reflect the same result: the mean expected modal altruism among men is smaller than among women (23.3% and 40.5%, linear regression coeff = 0.172, t = 5.51, p-value=0.000). Also the median expected modal donations reflect the same results (10% and 50%, Fisher's exact: p-value=0.171) for men and women respectively. The top part of Table 1 shows the relevant tests. Thus women are expected to be more altruistic than men. Figure 3 : Study 2. Expected behaviour of men and women. When asked to guess dictator's donation knowing that the dictator is a man, the main mode of the guesses is 0. Conversely, when asked to guess dictator's donation knowing that the dictator is female, the main mode of the guesses is 5, half of the endowment. Thus, women are expected to be more altruistic than men.
Then, we analyse whether both men and women expect women to be more altruistic than men. This is indeed the case: women are expected to be more altruistic than men both by men (mean guesses: 20.4% vs 38.5%; coeff = 0.181, t =4.11, p-value=0.000; median guesses: 0% vs 50%, Fisher's exact: p-value= 0.000) and by women (mean guesses: 26.9% vs 43.1%; coeff = 0.162, t = 3.72, p-value=0.000; median guesses: 20% vs 50%, Fisher's exact: p-value=0.999). 2 Finally, we observe that, when recipients are asked to predict women's behaviour, then more women than men guess the correct mode (70.7% vs 54.1%, Fisher's exact: p-value=0.071), but when recipients are asked about men's behaviour, then results trended, although not significantly so, in the opposite direction: more men than women tend to guess the correct mode (53.6% vs 38.2%, Fisher's exact: p-value=0.104). Moreover, men are marginally significantly better at guessing women's modal choice (54.0% guessed it right) than women are at guessing men's modal choice (only 38.2% guessed it right; Fischer's exact: p-value=0.079). In the aggregate, people are more accurate at predicting females' modal altruism than males' (61.4% vs 46.7%, Fisher's exact: p-value=0.024). Note that, in these analyses, samples are very small (about 65 observations per condition), and this might explain the lack of statistical significance, despite the relatively large effect sizes).
Conclusion
We studied gender differences in Dictator Game altruistic behaviour and expectations of altruistic behaviour on a large sample of US residents recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). We found that: (i) women are more altruistic than men and (ii) both women and men expect women to be more altruistic than men.
The fact that women are expected to be more altruistic than men may explain why they are punished to a larger extent than men when they fail to act altruistically (Heilman and Chen, 2005; Heilman and Okimoto, 2007) . Moreover, over-expecting communal behaviour from women may in turn lead to labor segregation, with women being offered predominantly less competitive and less paid jobs (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2001; Aguiar et al., 2009) .
Our first result is in line with and extend previous studies using student samples. This is a non-trivial extension because AMT samples are more representative than student samples but less representative than random samples of the population (Berinsky et al., 2012; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014; Shapiro et al., 2013) . While previous research has found gender differences in student samples, it has been suggested that gender differences in altruistic behaviour may not extend to random samples (Cappelen et al., 2015; Carpenter et al., 2008) .
Our second result roughly confirms the only existing study we are aware of on the same topic (Aguiar et al., 2009 ), but with an important difference. While Aguiar et al. (2009) , using a student sample, found that women are expected to be more altruistic than men only by other women, we found that, in our sample of AMT workers, women are expected to be more altruistic than men by both women and men.
We have also found some evidence that each gender is better at predicting their own gender's behaviour, rather than the other gender's. Moreover, men seems to be better than women at predicting the other gender's behaviour. However, all these results are only (close to) marginally significant, partly due to the small sample size, and thus they require further work in order to be validated or invalidated. Additionally, we observe that, while there is correspondence between mean actual donation and mean expected donation among men (mean donation = 24.8%, mean guess = 23.3%), the mean donation is significantly smaller than the mean expected donation among women (mean donation = 30.3%, mean guess = 40.5%, p < .001). However, this does not allow us to conclude that women are expected to be more altruistic than they actually are, because our design measures people's beliefs about the modal donation, and not those about the mean donation. Exploring whether women are expected to be more altruistic than they actually are is a primary direction for future research, with potential implications on real-world settings that could contribute to explain why women are punished to a larger extent than men when they fail to act altruistically (Heilman and Chen, 2005; Heilman and Okimoto, 2007) .
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Details about sample size and payment procedure
Since dictators were asked comprehension questions, while receivers were not, and since subjects failing any comprehension question were automatically excluded from the survey, we had fewer dictators (N = 457) than receivers (N = 530). This is not problematic for the analysis, because we never compared dictators with receivers. As for the computation of receivers' payoffs, since there is no one-to-one correspondence between dictators and receivers, to avoid deception, we proceeded as follows: after the data were collected, receivers were sequentially paired with a randomly selected dictator; in case a dictator had already been used to pay another receiver, we paid the current receiver 'out of our pocket', and not using the donation of that dictator, because that donation had already been used. This procedure is doable on Amazon Mechanical Turk (because participants are matched only after the end of the experiment) and allows us to avoid deception (because each dictator gets paired with one receiver, and each receiver receives a real donation).
